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Abstract— This paper examines linear beamforming
methods for secure communications in a multiuser wiretap
channel with a single transmitter, multiple legitimate
receivers, and a single eavesdropper, where all nodes
are equipped with multiple antennas. No information
regarding the eavesdropper is presumed at the transmitter,
and we examine both the broadcast MIMO downlink with
independent information, and the multicast MIMO down-
link with common information for all legitimate receivers.
In both cases the information signal is transmitted with
just enough power to guarantee a certain SINR at the
desired receivers, while the remainder of the power is
used to broadcast artificial noise. The artificial interference
selectively degrades the passive eavesdropper’s signal while
remaining orthogonal to the desired receivers. We analyze
the confidentiality provided by zero-forcing and optimal
minimum-power beamforming designs for the broadcast
channel, and optimal minimum-MSE beamformers for
the multicast channel. Numerical simulations for the rel-
ative SINR and BER performance of the eavesdropper
demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed physical-
layer security schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The growing interest in security at the physical layer
of wireless communications has sparked a resurgence of
research in information-theoretic secrecy. Physical layer
security incorporates signal and code design to limit the
information that can be extracted by an eavesdropper at
the bit level, as a supplement to classical cryptographic
security at the link or higher layers. Wyner’s landmark
paper on secure communications in a point-to-point
wiretap channel [1] paved the way for characterizing the
secrecy capacity of specific types of multiuser broadcast,
interference, and multiple-access channels with single-
antenna nodes [2]–[6], although their general secrecy
capacity regions under fading remain mostly unknown.
Similarly, the secrecy capacity achievable in multiple-
input multiple-output (MIMO) multiuser networks is
largely an open problem, with limited results avail-
able for MIMO broadcast channels with two receivers
[7]. In the majority of the literature on confidential
transmissions in multiuser networks, knowledge of the
probability distribution of the eavesdropper’s channel is
assumed at the transmitter, which inherently provides
information about the number of eavesdropper antennas
as well.
Motivated by the above, this paper studies the effec-
tiveness of simple beamforming strategies for maintain-
ing confidentiality in a MIMO downlink system with
multiple legitimate multi-antenna receivers and a single
passive eavesdropper with an unknown channel distribu-
tion. A portion of the transmit power is used to broadcast
the information signal vector with just enough power to
guarantee a certain signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio
(SINR) for the intended receivers, and the remainder of
the power is used to broadcast artificial noise in order to
mask the desired signal from a potential eavesdropper.
The artificial interference is designed to be orthogonal to
the information-bearing signals at the intended receivers,
which ensures that only the eavesdropper suffers a SINR
penalty. Jamming potential eavesdroppers with artificial
noise has been previously proposed for a point-to-point
MIMO wiretap channel in [8], [9].
For the MIMO broadcast channel with independent
signals, we compare the power efficiency and relative
SINR of two different approaches: a zero-forcing beam-
forming design, and an iterative minimum-power joint
transmit-receive beamformer design with a minimum
SINR constraint per user. The zero-forcing solution
allocates slightly lower power for artificial noise at low
transmit power levels, but enjoys a significant advantage
in terms of complexity. For the MIMO multicast channel,
an iterative minimum-power optimal beamformer design
is employed with a minimum mean square error (MMSE)
criterion for each user.
In the next section, the mathematical models for the
MIMO broadcast and multicast channels are presented.
The known algorithms for zero-forcing beamforming
and the optimal minimum-power beamformer design are
outlined in Section III. The wiretapping strategies that
2a potential eavesdropper could employ are described in
Section IV. The resulting system performance is studied
via simulation in Section V, and concluding remarks are
presented in Section VI.
Notation: E{·} denotes expectation, (·)T the transpose,
(·)H the Hermitian transpose, Tr(·) is the trace operator,
[A]p,q denotes the (p, q) entry of matrix A, diag {x} is
a diagonal matrix with vector x on the diagonal, ‖·‖2 is
the Euclidean norm, 1 is a column vector of ones, and
I is an identity matrix of appropriate dimension.
II. MATHEMATICAL MODEL
The network under consideration is comprised of
a Nt-antenna transmitter broadcasting to K legitimate
receivers with Nr antennas each, and a single passive
eavesdropper with Ne antennas in the vicinity of the
network. For the moment, we assume K < Nt, and also
remark that the proposed secrecy scheme is valid for
an arbitrary number of eavesdroppers. The transmitter is
assumed to have perfect channel state information (CSI)
for all of the intended receivers, but is unaware of either
the instantaneous CSI or the distribution of the CSI for
the eavesdropper. This lack of information precludes the
use of secrecy capacity as our performance metric, thus
we choose to work directly with SINR. The transmitter’s
primary objective is to allow each of the desired receivers
to recover the transmitted data with a certain SINR,
while denying the eavesdropper as much information as
possible about the data. Similar to the approaches taken
in [8], [9], this will be accomplished by transmission of
a jamming signal simultaneously with the data intended
for the desired receivers.
We will treat two separate cases: (1) transmission of
a unique data symbol to each of the K users, referred
to as ‘broadcasting’, and (2) sending the same com-
mon information signal to all receivers, referred to as
‘multicasting.’ The data model for these two scenarios
is detailed below.
A. MIMO Broadcast Channel
In the broadcast scenario considered here, the trans-
mitter wishes to send a private, independent scalar mes-
sage zk to each receiver. The transmitter employs a linear
Nt×1 transmit beamformer tk for the information sym-
bol zk of each intended receiver, and is assumed to have
a total power constraint P encompassing information
transmission and jamming. We denote the information
signal by the K × 1 vector z = (z1, . . . , zK)T , and
the jamming signal by the Nt × 1 vector z′. Assume
unit-norm transmit beamformers tHk tk = 1, and symbol
power E{|zk|2} = ρkP , where 0 < ρk ≤ 1 is the fraction
of the power devoted to the information signal of user
k, and ρ ≡ ∑Kk=1 ρk is the fraction of the total power
used for information transmission.
Define
E{z′z′H} = Q′z Tr(Q′z) = (1− ρ)P,
and let T = [t1 . . . tK ] denote the aggregate transmit
beamforming matrix. The signal broadcast by the trans-
mitter is then given by
x = Tz+ z′. (1)
In a flat-fading scenario, the received signal at the kth
legitimate receiver, k = 1, . . . ,K, can be written as
yk = Hktkzk +
K∑
j 6=k
Hktjzj +Hkz
′ + nk, (2)
where Hk is the corresponding Nr ×Nt channel matrix
between the transmitter and user k, and nk is the
naturally occurring i.i.d additive white Gaussian noise
vector with covariance E{nbnHb } = σ2nI. Analogous
parameters can be defined for the eavesdropper, who
receives
ye = He
K∑
j=1
tjzj +Hez
′ + ne. (3)
The kth receiver uses a Nr×1 beamformer wk to recover
its information, which leads to the decision variable
zˆk = w
H
k Hktkzk+w
H
k Hk
K∑
j 6=k
tjzj+w
H
k Hkz
′+wHk nk.
(4)
B. MIMO Multicast Channel
In the case of multicast, a common information sym-
bol z with power E{|z|2} = ρP is transmitted to all K
receivers. This necessitates the use of a common Nt× 1
transmit beamformer u, with uHu = 1. Assuming the
same power constraints and artificial noise properties as
in Section II-A, the transmitted signal is
x = uz + z′. (5)
The received signals are now
yk = Hkuz +Hkz
′ + nk (6)
ye = Heuz +Hez
′ + ne, (7)
and the kth receiver employs a Nr × 1 beamformer rk
to obtain its decision variable as
zˆk = r
H
k Hkuz + r
H
k Hkz
′ + rHk nk. (8)
3C. Artificial Noise
As will be discussed in the next section, our goal
will be to minimize the total transmit power required
to achieve a certain SINR for each receiver, and use all
remaining power to jam the eavesdropper. To achieve this
goal, we will choose the transmit and receive beamform-
ers in such a way that the jamming signal does not impact
the quality of the desired receiver’s signal. Assuming the
transmitter is aware of the beamformers used by each of
the receivers, an effective downlink channel to the K
receivers can be constructed for either the broadcast or
multicast case as follows:
H˜ =
[
H˜1 . . . H˜K
]T (9)
where H˜k =
(
wHk Hk
)T
or H˜k =
(
rHk Hk
)T
. When
K < Nt, the jamming signal z′ can be chosen from
the nullspace of H˜ in order to guarantee that it does not
impact the desired receivers. If K ≥ Nt, the nullspace of
the effective downlink channel does not exist in general,
and the artificial noise could not be guaranteed to be
orthogonal to the desired signals. Although the artificial
noise can still be constructed so as to minimize its impact
at the receivers (e.g., by forcing it to lie in the right sub-
space of H˜ with smallest singular value), a scheduling
strategy to ensure K < Nt may be more appropriate in
the context of this work. We note that user scheduling
in wireless networks with secrecy considerations has
received limited attention thus far.
III. BEAMFORMING DESIGN
In either the broadcast or multicast case, the design
of the transmit and receive beamformers is, in gen-
eral, coupled; that is, the choice of tk,u depends on
the choice of wk, rk respectively, and vice versa. One
solution to this problem is to fix the beamformer on
one end of the link and then optimize the other. An
optimal approach would design the beamformers jointly,
although at the expense of increased complexity [12]-
[15]. In this paper, we consider both types of approaches.
In the first, zero-forcing at the transmitter is used for
design of the transmit beamformers in the broadcast case;
this eliminates multi-user interference at each receiver,
and leads to a simple maximum-ratio combiner at each
receiver. In the second approach, we consider the optimal
joint beamformer design problem for both the broadcast
and multicast cases. The lack of eavesdropper CSI pre-
empts the development of beamforming designs tailored
towards maximizing a particular secrecy metric; hence
we utilize existing precoding methods as discussed in
the sequel.
A. Zero-Forcing Beamforming
In this section, we adopt a modified version of the
coordinated zero-forcing beamforming approach in [11].
Assume that K < Nt, and for user k, define H˜k as
H˜k =
[
h˜1 . . . h˜k−1 h˜k+1 . . . h˜K
]
(10)
h˜l =
(
wHl Hl
)T
.
The singular value decomposition (SVD) of H˜k yields
H˜k = U˜kD˜k
[
V˜
(s)
k v˜
(0)
k
]H
, (11)
where U˜k is the matrix of left singular vectors, D˜k
is the diagonal matrix of singular values, v˜(0)k is the
right singular vector associated with the smallest (zero)
singular value, and V˜(s)k is the collection of right singular
vectors corresponding to other singular values.
Evidently, v(0)k is a logical choice for the kth trans-
mit beamformer tk given the objective of nulling all
multiuser interference. Since receiver k then sees only
its desired signal in spatially white noise, the optimal
receive beamformer wk is simply the maximum-ratio
combiner:
wk = Hktk. (12)
Assuming that the jamming signal is orthogonal to
wHk Hk, the SINR at user k can then be written as
SINRk =
ρkP |wHk Hktk|2
σ2nw
H
k wk
. (13)
For a target SINR Sk, the required power allocation for
user k can be calculated as
ρk =
σ2nSk
tHk H
H
k HktkP
. (14)
B. Optimal Minimum Transmit Power Beamforming with
per-user SINR constraint
Although relatively simple, the proposed zero-forcing
algorithm in Section III-A will not in general mini-
mize ρP . To minimize the transmit power necessary
to achieve the desired SINR, it is necessary to jointly
design the transmit and receive beamformers [12]-[15].
Since the optimal beamformers will not be of the zero-
forcing type, the downlink beamformer design problem
is non-convex due to the interdependence of the problem
variables. This issue can be overcome by exploiting the
SINR duality of the downlink and uplink channels, which
states that the minimum sum power required to achieve
a set of SINR values on the downlink is equal to the
minimum sum power required to achieve the same SINR
vector on the dual uplink channel [15]. Therefore, as
4a benchmark we compute the optimum transmit/receive
beamformers and power allocation that minimizes the
sum transmit power while satisfying the SINR constraint
per user based on [14], [15].
Let t(i)k , w
(i)
k , p
(i)
k and q
(i)
k represent the trans-
mit/receive beamformers and downlink/uplink power al-
location for user k at the ith iteration. Define gs,k for
s, k = 1, . . . ,K as the signal and interference powers
for each user:
gs,k ,


∣∣∣∣(t(i)s )H HHk,sw(i)k
∣∣∣∣2for uplink∣∣∣∣(w(i)k )H Hk,st(i+1)s
∣∣∣∣2for downlink
(15)
The SINR per stream on either link can then be written
as
γk =
xk |gs,s|2
1 +
∑K
i=1,i 6=s xi |gs,i|2
(16)
where xk is the power allotted to user k either on the
downlink or the dual uplink channel. Finally, define
matrices C and D as
[C]s,k =
{
gs,k if s 6= k
0 if s = k (17)
D = diag
{
γth
g1,1
, . . . ,
γth
gK,K
}
. (18)
The iterative beamformer design that minimizes the
transmit power can be summarized as follows.
1) Set the initial transmit beamformers to the zero-
forcing solution t(0)k = v˜
(0)
k , with an initial power
allocation p(0)k = P/K per user. Compute the
optimum set of receive beamformers as
w
(i)
k =
√
p
(i)
k t
(i)H
k H
H
k
(
K∑
i=1
p
(i)
k Hkt
(i)
k t
(i)H
k H
H
k + I
)−1
.(19)
2) Now consider the dual uplink channel where the
transmit beamformers from Step 1 serve as the
receive beamformers, and vice versa. Update the
power allocation vector q(i+1) = x∗ from
x∗ = (I−DC)−1 D1, (20)
then update the beamformer set using (21):
t
(i)
k =
√
q
(i)
k w
(i)H
k Hk
(
K∑
i=1
q
(i)
k H
H
k w
(i)
k w
(i)H
k Hk + I
)−1
.(21)
Calculate the achieved SINR set on the uplink
using (16), and go to Step 3.
3) Revert back to the downlink channel and recom-
pute the power allocation vector p(i+1) = x∗ using
(20). Calculate the downlink SINR set using (16)
and compare with the uplink SINR vector from
Step 2 for convergence. If the stopping criterion is
not satisfied, set i = i + 1 and return to Step 2,
otherwise terminate the algorithm.
C. Optimal Minimum Transmit Power Beamforming
with per-user MSE constraint
Despite superficial similarities, the beamforming de-
sign problems with per-user SINR constraints for the
broadcast and multicast channels are fundamentally dif-
ferent. Many efficient numerical solutions exist for the
former as cited in Section III-A, whereas the multicast
problem is known to be non-convex even for the MISO
case with single antennas at each receiver. A number of
approximate solutions based on semidefinite relaxation
techniques have been proposed for the MISO multicast
channel, e.g. [16], [17].
However, the MIMO multicast beamforming problem
was recently reformulated as a convex optimization by
replacing the per-user SINR requirements with minimum
MSE constraints [18]. In this case, the optimal receiver
structure is known to be MMSE, which allows an alter-
nating iterative optimization of the transmit and receive
beamformers. The minimum sum-power optimization
problem can be expressed as a convex second-order cone
program (SOCP):
min
u,t
t
s.t. ‖u‖2 6 t,
‖vk‖2 6
√
εk − wk, ∀k
(22)
where εk is the MMSE constraint per user, vk =
rHk Hku− 1, and wk = σ2nTr
(
rkr
H
k
)
.
In brief, the algorithm is initialized with random
receive beamformers, after which the corresponding op-
timal transmit beamformer is computed by solving (22).
The receive beamformers are updated using the MMSE
criterion as
rk = u
HHHk
(
Hkuu
HHHk + σ
2
nI
)−1
, (23)
and the iterations continue until convergence. For con-
sistency with our choice of SINR as the performance
metric, the following equivalence relation between max-
imum SINR and MMSE is useful:
εk =
1
1 + SINRk
. (24)
Remark 1: For both zero-forcing and joint minimum-
power beamformer designs, the computations are carried
out at the transmitter, which then needs to supply the re-
ceivers with information about the optimal beamformers.
5This can be done using a limited (quantized) feedforward
scheme, as proposed in [19].
Remark 2: The assumption of perfect CSIT of the
intended receivers is admittedly a strong one. Robust
beamforming design for the MIMO downlink with multi-
antenna receivers is an ongoing research problem, with
some recent results provided in [20]. However, incorpo-
rating artificial noise into any such robust beamforming
schemes is not a straightforward extension, since the lack
of exact receiver CSI at the transmitter would no longer
allow any artificial noise to be perfectly orthogonal to
the intended receivers. The authors have conducted a
perturbation analysis to capture the performance degra-
dation in single-user MIMO wiretap channels [21], and
an extension to the downlink case is in progress.
Remark 3: As mentioned previously, the assumption
that the number of receivers is less than the number
of transmit antennas in Section II-C can be relaxed by
implementing a user selection stage prior to transmis-
sion. The authors have shown in [22] that a greedy
algorithm which schedules the user set based on max-
imizing the transmit power available for artificial noise
performs close to an optimal exhaustive search in terms
of eavesdropper BER.
IV. WIRETAPPING STRATEGIES
We consider two types of eavesdropper strategies:
(1) a simple linear receiver approach in which the
eavesdropper attempts to maximize the SINR of the
data stream she is interested in decoding, and (2) a
multi-user decoding scheme in which the eavesdropper
uses maximum likelihood detection to decode all K
information-bearing waveforms. We begin by illustrating
approach (1) for the broadcast case, with the extension
to the multicast channel being straightforward. Assume
that the eavesdropper seeks to recover the data stream
of user k from her received signal given in (3). The
interference-plus-noise covariance matrix given that zk
is the symbol of interest is
Qke = He
K∑
j 6=k
tjt
H
j H
H
e +HeQ
′
zH
H
e + σ
2
eI. (25)
The maximum SINR beamformer for the data stream of
user k is then given by
we =
(
Qke
)−1
Hetk. (26)
The use of an optimal beamformer here presumes that
Hetk, k = 1, . . . ,K is somehow known at the eaves-
dropper. Using this approach, the SINR at the eaves-
dropper can be calculated to be
SINRe,k = t
H
k H
H
e
(
Qke
)−1
Hetk. (27)
An eavesdropper with more extensive computational
resources will attack the MIMO broadcast network using
a more sophisticated approach. In general, the optimal
decoder at the eavesdropper in terms of minimizing the
symbol error rate would be the following Maximum
Likelihood (ML) detector:
zˆ = argmin
z∈Z
{∥∥∥Q−1/2e (ye −HeTz)∥∥∥2
}
(28)
where Z is the signal space from which z is drawn,
and Qe = HeQ′zHHe +σ2eI is the interference-plus-noise
covariance matrix perceived by the eavesdropper.
In the next section, we present numerical examples
that show the SINR and the BER that the eavesdropper
experiences with the proposed jamming scheme.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
We investigate the performance of the eavesdropper
and the desired receivers as a function of the target
SINR at the receivers and the total available transmit
power. In each simulation, we assume a transmitter
with Nt = 4 antennas, K = 3 legitimate receivers
with Nr = 2 antennas each, and an eavesdropper with
Ne = 4 antennas. The channel matrices for all links
are composed of independent Gaussian random variables
with zero mean and unit variance. The background noise
power is assumed to be the same for all K receivers and
the eavesdropper: σ2n = σ2e = 1. The algorithm of [14] is
used to implement the optimal joint beamformer design,
and the SOCP in (22) was solved using the MATLAB
cvx optimization toolbox [23]. All of the displayed
results are calculated based on an average of 5000 trials
with independent channel and noise realizations.
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Fig. 1. Power fraction versus transmit power P for K = 3 users,
Nt = 4, Nr = 2, Ne = 4 antennas.
6Figure 1 displays the average fraction of the transmit
power allocated to data and artificial noise by the zero-
forcing and the optimal minimum transmit power beam-
forming algorithms with an SINR threshold of 5 dB.
The joint design requires roughly 10% less transmit
power at small to intermediate power levels, albeit with
a significantly greater level of complexity. The curve
labeled “User 1,ZF” represents the fraction of the total
power assigned to an arbitrary user (referred to as user 1)
among the three legitimate receivers.
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Fig. 2. SINR versus transmit power P for K = 3 users, Nt =
4, Nr = 2, Ne = 4 antennas.
Figure 2 shows the achieved SINR levels versus
transmit power P for user 1 and the average SINR
averaged over all three streams for the eavesdropper
when using single-user detection. The legitimate receiver
almost always achieves the desired SINR target of 5 dB,
while the eavesdropper has a significantly lower SINR
due to the artificial noise. The SINR of user 1 is slightly
below 5 dB for transmit powers of 10 and 15 dB, since
there were a few trials for which the 5 dB SINR target
could not be achieved. In such cases, the transmitter
devotes all power to the desired receivers and none to
jamming, and the resulting SINR is averaged in with the
other trials. Note that there is not a significant difference
in performance for the eavesdropper whether the zero-
forcing or optimal broadcast beamformers are used.
Figure 3 compares the eavesdropper’s BER with and
without artificial noise when the eavesdropper employs
MIMO ML detection, assuming an uncoded BPSK-
modulated information signal z and zero-forcing trans-
mit beamforming. For low target SINRs, we observe
a significant degradation in the eavesdropper’s inter-
ception capabilities, e.g., by approximately 10.5 dB at
BER = 0.05. A more modest gain of 2.5 dB is achieved
at BER = 10−2 for intermediate target SINRs. At
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Fig. 3. Eavesdropper maximum-likelihood BER versus target SINR
S for K = 3 users, Nt = 4, Nr = 2, Ne = 4 antennas.
high SINR thresholds, the two curves converge since
the transmitter is constrained to allocate progressively
smaller fractions of the total power to jamming.
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Figure 4 displays the fraction of the transmit power
allocated to data and artificial noise by the multicast min-
imum transmit-power beamforming algorithm of Sec-
tion III-C, with SINR thresholds of S = 5 dB, 10 dB.
The lack of inter-user interference allows the transmitter
to allocate more power for jamming compared to the
broadcast case for the same transmit power.
Figure 5 shows the average achieved SINR levels
at the intended receivers and the eavesdropper versus
transmit power P for user SINR thresholds of S = 5
dB, 10 dB. As before, the legitimate receivers achieve
the desired SINR targets, while the eavesdropper’s per-
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Fig. 5. SINR versus transmit power P for K = 3 users, Nt =
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formance is degraded. However, the degradation in the
eavesdropper’s SINR is not as severe as in the broadcast
case since there is no multiuser interference to compound
the effect of the artificial noise.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has examined beamforming strategies com-
bined with artificial noise for providing confidentiality at
the physical layer in multiuser MIMO wiretap channels.
For the MIMO broadcast channel with single-user de-
tection at the eavesdropper, the zero-forcing beamformer
design is shown to provide an acceptable level of per-
formance in terms of relative SINR when compared to
optimal joint transmit-receive beamforming algorithms.
The use of artificial noise is meaningful even when the
eavesdropper employs optimal ML joint detection for the
information vector. For the MIMO multicast channel, the
degradation in the eavesdropper’s SINR as the transmit
power increases is not as severe, but artificial noise is
still seen to be effective.
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